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This thesis seeks to find the causal relationship between a foreign 
concessional loan and the government incumbency for the case of Mongolia. 
As a result, using multiple regression analysis, the causal relationship 
between two variables showed positive result which indicates that the 
increase of concessional loan makes the incumbent government stay longer. 
The conclusion is that the government borrows more concessional loan 
from donors to stay longer in power and use the foreign loan sources to 
finance the projects which are in line with their political interests.  
Additionally, the literature review explains the facts that some projects 
financed by foreign concessional loan are inefficient and the ODA is not an 
effective tool for economic growth and the development of the country. The 
reasons for inefficiency are that donor countries have their own economic 
interests and target the ones according to their needs. Also, the allocated 
financing is not used efficiently where it is needed and recipient countries 
buy products at higher prices, which makes ODA project results inefficient 
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at the end.  
Not only inefficiency, I discussed negative impacts of ODA in the thesis. 
The worst is a debt trap which has become an important issue for 
developing countries recently, including Mongolia, because many 
developing countries fall into a debt trap due to its inability to repay their 
debt back to the donor country. Due to the poor ODA policy created by the 
government, countries’ external debt increases sharply and sovereign 
countries are facing reconsideration of their independence. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the structure of study, including the background, 
problem statement and the research purpose. 
1.1. Background  
The modern history of Mongolia started when Mongolia declared its 
independence in July 11, 1921 after the fall of Qing Dynasty1 in 1911 and 
established the unitary socialist sovereign state, the Mongolian People’s 
Republic, in 1924 with the participation of Soviet Union2. Thenceforward, 
in the following years, Soviet power took place and Mongolia encouraged 
communism within the country for almost 70 years. There was only one 
political party, the Mongolian People’s Party, in power until the year of 
Soviet Union dissolution had started.   
In 1990, Mongolia had a democratic movement headed by young politicians 
against Soviet rule as other countries had s disintegration with Soviet Union. 
As a result, the movement was successfully led to a democratic revolution, 
the amendment of the Constitution, legalization of new political parties, 
                                           
1  Mongolia had been under control of Manchus, who later established Qing 
dynasty, since 1691 for more than 200 years.   
2 After the fall of Qing Dynasty, Republic of China was also established and 
Chinese called themselves the successor of Qing Dynasty. Chinese tried to occupy 
Mongolia, however, Mongolians got military help from Soviet Union and could 
declare its independence.  
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establishment of a standing legislative body and creation of an office for 
the president. The very first parliament election after the democracy was 
held in 1992 in Mongolia and adopted a new constitution which was subject 
to lead to democracy and prosperity. By the new constitution, the People’s 
Republic was abolished from the name of the country.  
Mongolia’s transition from communism to democracy and a single-party 
authoritarian system to an open market economy had brought a huge 
opportunity for further development of the country. Even though Mongolia 
had some rough relations with both neighbors, Russia and China, in the past, 
the priority is always to maintain friendly and balanced relationships with 
them in the future.   
Currently, Mongolia can be described as country with a semi-presidential 
system because the president is elected directly by the citizens, and has 
extensive powers such as, initiating legislative bills and appointing 
Supreme Court judges, issuing guidelines for the government, and heading 
the National Security Council. The president is the head of the country and 
is chosen by four-year terms.  
The prime minister is the head of the government, however, the parliament 
of Mongolia has all legislative power. The party who gets the most seats in 
the parliament forms the government and confirms the appointment of the 
prime minister and cabinet members. The parliament has the power to 
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declare states of emergency and war, ratify international treaties and 
agreements, enact and amend laws, draft legislation, approve the annual 
budget and foreign and domestic policies. The parliament is consisted of 76 
members who are chosen by the majority vote for four-year terms. Since 
1990 until today, Mongolia had 7 parliament elections and 18 governments 
including the current one. Basically, throughout the times, the Government 
had changed approximately 2 times in one parliament term. 
There are two major political parties in power in Mongolia. The one is the 
oldest political party, the Mongolian People’s Party which is a powerful and 
well-regulated political institution following the old Soviet rule, while the 
another is the Democratic party which is more oriented to lowering taxes, 
accessing to foreign direct investment, and maintaining the judiciary 
independence that are essential for the rule of law to be in power. 
Throughout the times since 1990’s, these two parties are dominating in the 
parliament one by one. The political party who took the majority seats in 
parliament can affect every decision made by the government including 
public and foreign policies, expenditures, and investments. The common 
attitude of the political parties in Mongolia is usually to allocate more 
public expenditures and investments to their election constituencies to get 
more votes for their next parliament election. However, after almost 30 
years had passed, the democracy of Mongolia is still in the process of 
developing, economy is not doing very well and people are still in poverty. 
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Political and public institutions are not stable and corruption took place 
everywhere. Fractions and populism within political parties and within the 
Government had been increased and two major parties always fight with 
each other even though they tried to form coalition governments few times 
already.  
Mongolia had faced substantial economic challenges in the first years after 
the transition in the 1990s from communism to democracy. The economy 
was thoroughly dependent on foreign loans and aids to recover from the 
downturns. Official development assistance (ODA) was the most essential 
tool to strengthen economic growth and the political situation, especially 
during the early years after transition. In the early 2000s, Mongolia had 
taken significant actions toward the establishment of more contemporary 
and strong economy, based upon its mining sector.  
Mongolia has a huge deposits of coking-coal, gold, uranium, and copper. 
There are few big mining companies, but to highlight the Oyu-Tolgoi and 
Tavan-Tolgoi are the ones which are always on attention of everyone, local 
and foreign. Oyu-Tolgoi which started its operation in 2010 is the single 
largest project in the world for mining gold and copper while Tavan-Tolgoi 
is the largest undeveloped coal mine in the world. The first investment of 
$5 billion for Oyu-Tolgoi was made in 2011 by foreign investors and 
procurement for contractor was finalized at Tavan-Tolgoi at the same year. 
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Due to those good news, foreign investors rushed to Mongolia seeking 
investments not only in mining sector. The economy of Mongolia reached 
at its peak with gross domestic product(GDP) growth to 17.3%, driving 
double-digit economic growth, in 2011 from 6.4% in 2010, and since then 
the economy had sustained to grow twice a more for years3 (Monitoring 
Profile of Mongolia-2016, 2016). This growth from the mining sector had 
an enormous influence on the expansion of other sectors, including 
infrastructure, information and communication technology and energy. 
During this period, foreign direct investment and foreign trade have taken 
place of foreign loan and aid.  
Although, this glee had ended soon and the recession had pushed Mongolia, 
the natural resource and mining dependent country, in challenging 
circumstances during 2014 to 2016. The cause was driven by a decrease of 
commodity price in the world, especially in People’s Republic of China 
which is the largest export market of Mongolia covering about 84% of 
whole exports since 2005. About 80% of Mongolia’s export4 consists of 
minerals and 68.4% of the mining exports went to the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) (NSO, 2018).  
Thereby, the slowdown in the economy of PRC had given negative impacts, 
                                           
3 The detailed graph of GDP growth rate is shown in APPENDIX A. 




and economic downturn after the mining boom has brought the following 
knock to the economy of Mongolia: 
- The large deficit, along with Mongolian currency depreciation, 
drove general government debt to 93.1 percent of GDP in 2016, 
- Credit ratings downgraded from BB- to B-, 
- FDI fell from 4.5 billion USD in 2012 (more than 40 percent of 
GDP) to nearly zero in 2015,  
- Demand for mineral from China weakened and coal and copper 
export prices fell sharply, 
- Higher costs of international borrowing, large financing needs and 
high interest rates threatened debt sustainability. 
To fight with the economic downturns, the Government of Mongolia has 
officially brought official development assistance policy back to attention. 
Since that time, total official development assistance inflows, especially the 
concessional loan amount, have relatively been increasing and diplomatic 
relations with donor countries have been restored. 
The economy of Mongolia is heavily dependent on mining sector. Until the 
mining sector, especially Oyu-Tolgoi and Tavan-Tolgoi projects start 
generating investment returns and giving a positive impact to the economy, 
the concessional loan from foreign countries and multilateral organizations 
would be expected to mend the economic gap and still be in demand. Hence, 
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Mongolia has a long journey to tolerate with development partners for many 
years ahead.  
1.2. The Statement of the Problem 
The life cycle of governments5 is quite short in Mongolia, with median age 
of 1.9 in years, since the beginning of the transition from communism to 
democracy in the beginning of 1990s. The making and breaking of 
governments has become an opaque process in Mongolia. The reasons are 
the following; a change in government is demanded whether on the basis of 
an election, a resigned government, a conflict of interest within the parties 
who have seats in or outside the government, or a conflict of interest within 
the parties who have seats in the parliament which can directly affect to 
actions of the government or there exists some other reasons which we do 
not know. 
Each government tries to survive longer during a four-year parliament term 
to fulfill its purposes and goals, and their main financial sources have 
become ODA which can be raised in a shorter period of time comparing to 
other financial sources. Official development assistance; especially 
concessional loan from development partners, has been in demand in 
Mongolia since 1991. Until 2011, a foreign concessional loan has been a 
                                           
5 The detailed incumbency information of Government of Mongolia is shown in 
APPENDIX C.  
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major external financial source for the government and, in 2012, the 
Government of Mongolia had issued its first external bond named 
“Chinggis”. Since then, several external bonds have been issued including, 
the Mazaalai bond, the Samurai bond, and etc. Due to the high prices which 
are based on the market and the economy of the country, bonds6 are more 
expensive and the repayment period is shorter comparing to foreign 
concessional loans. Thus, foreign concessional loans, of which the interest 
rate ranges between 0.15%-3% with 13-50 years of repayment period, are 
still a demanding external source for the Government of Mongolia.  
Even though there is a geographical advantage in Mongolia located 
between two huge markets, China and Russia, the internal fights within 
political parties are blocking the further growth in mining sector. Foreign 
investors lost their confidence because of political instability caused by 
political party interests and the environment for foreign direct investment 
has become not favorable anymore. The huge deposit of natural resource 
still untapped underneath the ground and it is taking long time for mining 
sector to give its fruits to the economy.    
Due to the high expense and the long period to raise other financial sources, 
the only best option for government has become borrowing loan from 
                                           
6 The interest rates of external bonds range from 1.5% to 7.5% and the repayment 
period is 3 to 10 years. 
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development partners in concessional term.  
However, on the other hand, the government debt7 which is one of the 
important indicator for economic development, has been increased from 
26.7% in 2011 to 93.1% of GDP in 2016 reaching at its highest in 10 years 
(MOF, 2018). Borrowing cheaper sources from our friends might be good 
short-term solution for implementing development plans, however in other 
thoughts, question for what worse can happen due to the increasing number 
of government debt in the future is raised.  
Therefore, this thesis seeks to analyze what impacts the foreign 
concessional loan have in the long term, how it affects for the government 
activity and to define whether the increasing amount of concessional loan 
affects the incumbency of the government due to the many number of 
changes in the government for the past 29 years.  
1.3. Purpose of Research and Research Questions 
This research will focus mainly on determining, examining and analyzing 
the increase of ODA, more specifically the concessional loan which affects 
the sharp growth for government debt, and whether it affects the 
government itself to shake from the ground.   
                                           
7 Government debt is how much the government owes to the creditors outside the 
government itself.  
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Also, this research aims to elaborate key issues related to the trends towards 
the increasing number of concessional loan amount from year to year and 
what impact it can bring to the country in the long run.  
The research question that this study aims to answer is the following: 
1. Does foreign concessional loan affect the duration of the 
government in Mongolia during the last 29 years? Does foreign 
concessional loan affect government incumbency in a positive way 
or more to the negative way? 
 
2. What is the long- term impact of concessional loan to the 
developing country like Mongolia? And what are examples of 
consequences and impacts of ODA to recipient countries which 
borrowed high number of concessional loans from foreign 
countries? 
The research objective is not only determining the impact of concessional 
loan to the incumbency of the government, but also to define the positive 
and negative impacts of ODA to the economy and society using the case of 
Mongolia and to raise further awareness, as well as to contribute to the 
empirical study of ODA and its impact.    
This thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 of this thesis provides literature 
review, Chapter 3 includes detailed methodology of the study and Chapter 
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4 discusses the research findings. The final chapter 5 addresses conclusion 
















CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The purpose of the literature review is to have a basic theoretical 
understanding of definitions of the main concepts and to have a knowledge 
of background on the facts. Hence, the literature review is more descriptive 
and comprehensive. Precedent studies concentrates not only on scientific 
journal articles but also studies from international organizations and 
researches which is basically practitioner-oriented. 
In this chapter, I first will determine the conception of government 
incumbency and how political power affects the incumbency of the 
government. Next, how incumbent government can affect to the society and 
the economy, and what relationship the government and ODA have, will be 
discussed. Afterwards, the ODA and its purpose will be explained. At the 
end of this chapter, I include and discuss the causes and consequences of 
the borrowing concessional loan, and how ODA affects and give impacts 
to the recipient countries.  
2.1. Government Incumbency and It’s Driving Force  
The government is consisted of members of the political parties who took 
the majority seats in the parliament. Political parties usually have three 
main goals: vote seeking, policy seeking and office seeking according to 
the article of Hans Keman (Keman, 2011). The first goal represents 
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behavior of parties with respect to the electorates in maximizing their 
presence and degree of dominance in parliament. The second goal is to 
direct government what is in the party's interest and reflects their ideas how 
society ought to be shaped by means of policy formation. The third goal is 
gaining access to the executive by competing with other parties for office. 
These are the participation of political parties in government. Political 
parties are the ones who make policy choices and control the government 
action (Keman, 2011). The argument, Keman made is that the composition 
and survival of a government has become more and more the result of 
parties' behavior aiming at incumbency, and thereby neglecting by and 
large whether or not the actual political course of action or policy-seeking 
behavior of government is more or less responsive to electoral preferences. 
Rather than being a party that is a mediator between state and society, the 
behavior of political parties change and it appears that parties and their 
leadership tend to become part of the 'state' only not the representative of 
the voters but to seek the offices.    
There are different types of political parties depending on their power in the 
parliament. A central party is that the party that is the one in between left-
right and progressive-conservative distribution of a party system. A 
dominant party is the one with most seats in parliament (Roozendaal, 1992). 
Obviously, parties being both central and dominant, pivot parties, play a 
crucial role in forming and running government and making public policies. 
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This implies that non-pivotal parties remain more dependent on other 
parties to prolong their incumbency successfully. Once a party has achieved 
a pivot position, it is more likely to stay in government for longer periods. 
According to the study of Keman, average government in Europe lasts 2.3 
years which is not very that far different from Mongolian case, while the 
world average is 3.7 years.    
The reasons for termination of governments, vary depending on different 
constitutions of each country. It can be electoral ones to conflict within 
government or parliament. According to Laver, early empirical studies have 
shown that a government that is ideologically compact, with a single-party 
majority cabinet or minimum winning coalition, in a party system with low 
fragmentation and subject to a formal investiture requirement is predicted 
to last a longer than an ideologically diverse minority coalition in a 
fragmented party system with no investiture requirement (Laver, 2003). 
Researchers also concluded that governments exist in a world of critical 
events, such that scandals, international conflicts, financial and monetary 
crises, the deaths and illnesses of key personalities, each of which poses a 
threat to the life of the incumbent administration (Laver, 2003). But those 
critical events can be occurred due to the interest of political parties or the 
policies introduced by the government itself.  
The change of government and the policies is a sign of political instability 
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as described by the researchers, Alesina et al, Gasiorowski, and Miljkovic 
and Rimal. Hence, they defined political instability in several ways. The 
most common are the following: to define it as the propensity for regime or 
government change, the incidence of political upheaval or violence in a 
society, such as assassinations, demonstrations, and instability in public 
policies and so forth. Just as there are a number of definitions of political 
instability, there are also a number of indices designed to measure the level 
of political instability in countries. The most commonly used indices are 
POLITY indices and the World Bank governance indices (WGI) in 
academic and policy use. 
2.2. Government Incumbency and the Socio-
Economy    
The economic growth and the political stability are very much 
interconnected. (Hussain, 2014). On the one hand, the uncertainty 
associated with an unstable political environment may reduce investment 
and the pace of economic development. On the other hand, poor economic 
performance may lead to government collapse and political unrest. For 
example, in the country like Mongolia with short government incumbency, 
the likelihood of a government change has a larger effect on the degree of 
uncertainty in the economic environment and the higher the degree of 
political polarization in society. Basically, the stable politics affects 
positively to the economy of the country.   
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Furthermore, political stability has impact on the increase of government 
efficiency. If government or policies change frequently, inefficient 
institutions can arise and persist and it can make the whole society unstable. 
According to the social conflict view, economic and political institutions 
are chosen by the groups that have political power at the time and they will 
make the changes within the institutions and choose policies that will 
maximize their own rents rather than benefiting the whole society. For 
example, Acemoglu and his colleagues stated in the article that political 
parties currently incumbent establish the economic institutions which will 
lead to different distributions of resources according to their needs 
(Acemoglu, D., Gallego, F.A. and Robinson, J.A, 2014). This will result in 
inefficiency for the government performance due to its lack of resource 
needed for certain groups.  
The economy may do well in terms of attracting foreign direct investment 
because stability means a predictable political environment and any more. 
However, there are also negative sides of political stability. Other aspects 
of the society might suffer because of lack of competition, complacency, 
and opacity due to the longer duration of a single government. 
Consequently, stability of the government does not necessarily lead to 
higher economic growth. India is a case in point. India’s performance on 
the economic front in the first 30 years of post-independence era, which 
epitomized political stability, exhibited 3 to 3.5 percent level of economic 
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growth, lowest in the last sixty years. In contrast, in the last 20 years when 
India saw as many as four Prime Ministers, industrial growth rates jumped 
to double digits, something that had not happened before (Hussain, 2014).  
Moreover, according to the World Bank report, political stability not only 
prevents any possible changes, but this can discourage the public. People 
look for changes in every public sectors to have a better development. 
Stable politics with the incumbent government which lasted for a long 
period decreases the chance of a competition which can lead to a corruption 
and the abuse of power in public sector. The principles of competition not 
only applies to the market. It also applies to every public sectors.  
So that, there are positive and negative sides for political stability, more 
specifically for the longer staying incumbent government. If so, according 
to the interest of this study, how incumbent government affects ODA or 
reverse impact will be discussed in the next sub-chapter.       
2.3. The Government and ODA 
When the power of Government is extensive, the fight for political power 
intensifies the resulting political tension. The result is that the energies and 
activities of citizens are shifted from economic activity to political activity. 
Bauer notes that the political effects cannot be simply observed by the 
commonly used statistics on the size of the government sector. There can 
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be the case where the government has more control over the expenditures 
focusing on providing the basic services for the citizens rather than being 
much involved in caring the economy. However the allocated government 
financial source is limited and government opens its arms to donors. So that, 
the ODA source somehow is used to finance the need of government in 
political reasons. Bauer mentions that “foreign aid is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for advance from poverty” but the countries 
become “dependent on large-scale foreign aid and gifts of food” with no 
significant rise in living standard (Bauer, 1969). Friedman argues that if 
ODA is allocated to help a group with political power for overcoming their 
political crisis during short term and letting them keep the political power 
may cause negative political effects. (Friedman, 1958)   
Moreover, there is a study noting that the bureaucracies of governments in 
developing countries can be weakened by the ODA (Knack, 2001). The 
research suggests that more opportunities to design and implement projects 
finaned by ODA should have been given to recipient governments, however, 
as a result, administrative capacity of the government increases extensively. 
The study of Remmer, with respect to government expenses and aids, also 
showed the same result that dependence on ODA encourages the expansion 
of government size in middle and lower income countries (Remmer, 2004). 
Rajan and Subramanian tested a hypothesis that aid may undermine the 
quality of governance using World Governance Indices and the result 
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showed that the increase of ODA is related to the weak governance (Rajan, 
R. G., Subramanian, A, 2006). As a production of government, public 
policies are vital for growth of the country. Burnside and Dollar 
investigated the relationships between ODA and institutions and policies 
that have direct impacts on growth, and the result of the study was that aid 
spurs growth with better institutional quality were more robust (Burnside, 
A. C., Dollar, D, 2004).  
To conclude, ODA is an effective tool for the government in terms of 
growth in many sectors if government takes the smart measures related to 
the ODA policy. Otherwise ODA might be as dangerous as the enemy to 
the government. Before studying deeper into the causal relationship 
between government incumbency and the ODA, let’s discuss what ODA is 
in detail for the next sub-chapters.    
2.4. The Fundamental Determinants of ODA and its 
purpose 
There are several external financial flows as described by OECD. These 
flows include: (i) remittances, (ii) private flows at market terms, including 
foreign direct investments, and total bank and non-bank purchases of bonds 
and other securities, including equities, (iii) private grants, (iv) non-
concessional source from multilateral and bilateral development partners 
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that do not meet the requirement of ODA and (v) concessional financial 
source from multilateral and bilateral development partners that meets the 
requirement of ODA.   
As described by OECD, concessional loans are loans that are cheaper than 
the market based loans and have longer period for repayments. The interest 
rate is also below the market value and grace period is longer than any other 
types of external financial sources.  
Development Assistance Committee, one of the organizations of OECD, 
has defined Official Development Assistance as follows: 
“Flows of official financing administered with the promotion of 
the economic development and welfare of developing countries as 
the main objective, and which are concessional in character with 
a grant element of at least 25 percent (using a fixed 10 % rate of 
discount). By convention, ODA flow comprises contributions of 
donor government agencies, at all levels, to developing countries 
(“bilateral ODA”) and to multilateral institutions. ODA receipts 
comprise disbursements by bilateral donors and multilateral 
institutions. Lending from export credit agencies—with the pure 
purpose of export promotion—is excluded.” 
In the paper of Antonios Balaskas, Eduardo Lima and Tyler Seed, ODA is 
classified into two types, bilateral and multilateral, depending on who 
provided. Bilateral ODA is development assistance conferred on a recipient 
country by a donor country (Antonios Balaskas, Eduardo Lima, Tyler Seed, 
2009). The distribution of ODA by a donor country is usually managed by 
that country's international development agency. These agencies are 
attached to a greater or lesser extent to the government's ministry or 
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department of foreign affairs. Examples of bilateral ODA agencies include 
the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Korean International 
Cooperation Agency (KOICA), the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), etc. Multilateral ODA is conferred on a recipient 
country by an international organization drawing on a pool of financing 
from a variety of donor countries. These organizations may be multi-
purpose international organizations such as the World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) or thematic/sector specific organizations such as the United 
Nations Children‘s' Fund (Antonios Balaskas, Eduardo Lima, Tyler Seed, 
2009). 
According to Antonios Balaskas, Eduardo Lima and Tyler Seed’s paper, 
there are several powerful incentives exist for developed country 
governments to become active donors. These very pragmatic and 
interconnected motivations include political and economic benefit, national 
security, better immigration control, expectations of the international 
community, popular public sentiment among its electorate, and global 
climate security. Also, in another article of Axel Michaelowa and Katharina 
Michaelowa, it is concluded that while poverty eradication has been 
officially set up as the central objective of aid, this does not necessarily 
imply that donors act accordingly. In fact, ever since the late 1970s, a large 
and growing amount of empirical literature on the geographical distribution 
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of aid has clearly established that donors strive for a multitude of different 
objectives. Aims such as export promotion, political and cultural hegemony, 
etc. are frequently given priority over recipients’ needs. The reasons can 
often be found in the political economy of individual donor countries: 
bureaucratic procedures which create incentives to spend a maximum 
amount of money within a restricted budget year, electoral processes which 
cannot be won with the objective of international poverty reduction, and 
lobbying by private firms that regard aid as an interesting pool for indirect 
subsidies (Axel Michaelowa, Katharina Michaelowa, 2007). This type of 
indirect purposes are usually brought by bilateral donors because 
multilateral donors establish their goals in a comprehensive manner, and 
their monitoring and control is quite strong comparing to bilateral donors 
due to the participation of multiparty and many countries.  
The fact is that aid in a bigger portion was used in achieving donors’ own 
interest rather than accomplish the main purpose to contribute for the 
progress of developing countries in meeting their basic needs, reduce 
poverty or any other tangible improvement in poor’s people live. In this 
case, the question comes up that whether the ODA was effective or not for 
the recipient countries at the end of implementation.  
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2.5. Effectiveness and Impact of ODA to Recipient 
Country 
Much of theoretical and empirical literatures have investigated the 
economic and social effects of ODA. Some empirical studies proved a 
positive impact of ODA on the economic and social growth of the recipient 
countries ( (Burnside, A. C., Dollar, D, 2004). Asteriou performed analysis 
to check the relationship between ODA and economic growth. He used a 
panel data set from 1975 to 2002 for five South Asian countries; 
Bangladesh, Nepal, India, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. The research provided 
robust evidence of a positive effect of ODA on GDP growth (Asteriou, 
2009). Jung & Lee also studies with the panel data of 41 developing 
countries from 1970 to 2010 and found the result that GDP has made a 
positive impact on ODA in the short term, and vice versa (Ki Hun Jung, 
Choong Lyol Lee, 2011). Moreover, Dalgaard and Tarp’s study explored 
the empirics for the claims with respect to the effectiveness of aid in the 
long term. The results implied there is a strong interaction between policy 
and aid. Further, the results reveal that aid can play a conducive role and 
have a positive impact on improving productivity in developing countries 
(C, J., Hansen Dalgaard, F Tarp, 2004).   
Yet there are many positive impacts and effects of ODA to the recipient 
countries, many empirical studies shed light on ineffectiveness of ODA. 
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Moyo stated that ODA was provided for several decades to poor countries, 
but unfortunately the result showed very little or non-growth in developing 
regions around the world, especially in Africa (Moyo, 2009). Basically it 
can be assumed due to the lack of effective aid. In this sense, people concern 
about the low impact of ODA and bring up debates in the international 
community about ODA effectiveness.  
Therefore, a new aid architecture was introduced to the international system 
to tackle down those issues and in 2010, the OECD Working Party on Aid 
Effectiveness remarks that the widespread promotion of development was 
not only about amounts of aid given, but also and more important about 
how aid was given (Mendez, 2017), which in other words is related to the 
alignment process, on how donors and recipient countries interact each 
other and how donor’s aid is distributed and recorded in the recipient 
country. It is not just matter of ownership where the main responsibility 
relies on the recipient country or harmonization where donors coordinate 
their activities to reduce fragmentation of aid in recipient countries. 
Alignment is more comprehensive, in other words means coordinated 
participation of donors and partners, which is the main importance of 
alignment implementation to make aid flows more effective (Mendez, 
2017).  
However, even the alignment and cooperation between donor and a 
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recipient has improved, ODA sources are not allocated according to the 
needs of recipient country but the need of a donor country to support their 
own economic development. For example, Eun Mee Kim and Jinhwan Oh 
did a research on whether donor countries allocate their sources according 
to the recipient countries’ needs and included the example of South Korea 
in their article. In the study, they classified recipient 154 countries into three 
parts based on their income: high, middle and low income countries. The 
first result of the study was that South Korean ODA was focused more on 
the higher-income developing countries with higher growth rates. More 
precisely, donor country’s interest was more into higher income developing 
countries and the humanitarian approach was into lower income countries 
but excluding the lowest level least developed poorer countries. The 
conclusion of the study was that South Korean ODA allocation shows a 
pattern consistent with economic interests (Eun Mee Kim, Jinhwan Oh, 
2012). Another example is that the ODA provided by Japan also was 
criticized because Japan did not dedicate much attention to the economic 
and social impacts of its ODA (Yamamoto, 2019) . Its approach considered 
only its own economic benefit. Disregarding the recipients' circumstances, 
Japan's ODA contributed to corruption, debt and controversial 
expropriations for large-scale infrastructure projects.    
ODA support is brought to a country as a project-support and it already 
became the traditional aid modality implemented in few decades. But it has 
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also been criticized that because it focuses just in individual projects, which 
are translated in high transaction cost and short term improvements. 
Soubotina stated in her article that in recent decades, tying arrangements 
were introduced to prevent mismanagement. Tying arrangements are sets 
of conditions, such as those that require “recipients to purchase goods and 
services from the donor country or from a specific group of countries,” 
(Soubotina, 2000). However, this may reduce the value of aid if the 
arrangements are motivated by a desire to benefit suppliers of donor 
countries and that may limits recipients from buying at the lowest price 
(Soubotina, 2000).Temple also argued that purchasing advice from 
overseas consultants, or purchasing goods from the donors countries reduce 
the effectiveness of the real results of the project, because it will cost more 
than the price recipient country can purchase goods and services 
domestically or at world price (Temple, 2010). This type of phenomenon 
such that tying arrangements related to the procurement is observed usually 
by the bilateral relations depending on the donors’ interest in return of their 
financing. 
Not only ineffectiveness of projects, there are negative consequences 
followed by ODA financed by donor countries. Cohen provides an example 
and suggests that even well-intentioned actions have consequences that are 
difficult to predict (Cohen, 2006). He took an example in his article saying 
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that the French colonialists used DDT8 to combat malaria and typhoid, and 
built a road to address the region’s isolation in a mountain village of Algeria 
under colonial rule. But, the unintended results were: population explosion, 
more intensive farming, and deterioration in the land needed to support the 
villagers’ livestock. Due to these consequences, some people fell into 
poverty, others became rich and inequality increased in the country. 
Moreover, Seunghyun Lee and Tobin Im stated in their article that more the 
recipient country receives ODA, the weaker their government systems 
become and it promotes corruption within government (Seunghyun Lee, 
Tobin Im, 2015). Since these effects are irreversible, whether aid is the right 
solution remains questionable. 
The worst consequence related to the concessional loans is a “Debt Trap’’9. 
In recent example is Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) implemented by the 
Government of PRC. There has been a lot of hue and cry over the China’s 
loan policy of which people call it "debt trap diplomacy" regarding African, 
Latin American and South Asian countries. BRI projects are mainly focused 
on infrastructure and scholars have argued that Chinese loans are erroneous, 
expensive, predatory and harmful to recipient countries (Baig, 2018). One 
of the example for debt trap is Maldives, the one stated in Baig’s article. A 
                                           
8 DDT is a chemical compound used for insect control.  
9 Debt trap is a situation in which a debt is difficult or impossible to repay, typically 
because high interest payments prevent repayment of the principal. 
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report published by a Washington based think tank, which evaluated the 
debt implications of China's massive BRI program, concluded that the 
Maldives is one of eight countries that may fall prey to high debt distress 
from Chinese investments (Baig, 2018). The Maldivian authorities believed 
that the level of debt is high, yet it has been injected mainly in growth 
enhancing infrastructure, however, Maldives is already fallen into difficulty 
of repayments and 80% of Maldives debt belongs to China. If Maldives 
falls behind, China would ask for equity form different island-owners and 
infrastructure operators are likely to finally get hold of the Maldivian land. 
Moreover, the decision of Sri Lanka in 2018 to lease Hambantota port to 
China in order to reduce its BRI10 debt burden is often cited as a prime 
example of debt trap diplomacy as experts say (Yamamoto, 2019). In 
contrary to that, chinese experts say that the investments target only 
infrastructure development of the developing countries, no other intention. 
There is no proof and evidence that China’s intention is to colonize the 
country, but still it is not going to kill anybody to have a little concern on 
their ODA sources and purposes.  
Meanwhile the fact is that ODA has both positive and negative economic 
and social impacts to the recipient country, I will be focusing deeply on the 
causal relationship between ODA, more specifically the concessional loan, 
                                           
10 More facts on BRI projects will further be discussed in Chapter 4.     
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
While the theoretical issues related to government incumbency and 
concessional loan issues are discussed in Chapter 2, I will describe the data 
and the method underlying this thesis in the following section. To measure 
the impact of foreign concessional loan on the government incumbency, I 
have chosen to take the hypothesis of the research as follows: 
H0: Concessional loan has a positive impact on the duration of the 
incumbent government. If government borrows more concessional loan 
from donor countries, it will be the factor for the extension of incumbent 
government.  
 
Pure triangulation research design using the both qualitative and 
quantitative approach would be the underlying research method for this 
study to determine whether the data bases yield the similar results.  
3.1. Variables and Data 
Incumbency of the Government cannot be observed directly. Some 
governments in Mongolia lasted longer during the full 4 year parliament 
term, while some are changed more frequently within few months. The 
reason for longer staying government can be economic power which led to 
growth of the country or well implemented policies which led to good 
governance that also affects the well reputation of government. The 
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government change is a distinct phenomenon and I will use limited 
dependent variable to study the duration of the government. The dependent 
variable for the research will be incumbency of the government or more 
specifically the duration of the government in quarterly time series. The 
duration of government is measured using 1 to 16 scores depending on the 
quarters the government was incumbent within 4 year parliament term.   
The independent variable is the foreign concessional loan outstanding 
amount by quarterly basis. Government has the power to take resources in 
a variety of constraints and make changes in social, economic and cultural 
conditions through their conversion capacity. ODA is one of the main 
financial resources the government of Mongolia utilizes for development 
purposes. The recipient governments should perform effectively to 
eradicate poverty and attain national development goals using the ODA 
sources, which at the end would strengthen the power of government and 
be the impact for their longer incumbency. 
This study controls some other economic, social and political variables that 
might have influences on the degree of government incumbency. To 
measure and to estimate strength of the empirical relationship between 
government incumbency and concessional loan, party affiliation, coalition 
government, political stability and absence of violence index, regulatory 
quality index, rule of law index, consumer price index, and foreign direct 
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investment amount are used as control variables. Using control variables in 
a multiple regression analysis will reduce the risk for omitted variable bias 
and provide more accurate insight into the effects that concessional loan 
have on government incumbency.  
As discussed in chapter 2, government is formed by the political parties 
which have majority seats in the parliament. Whether the government stays 
stable and incumbent will depend on the power of political party and how 
strong the opposition party is. So that party affiliation of incumbent 
government and single party or coalition government status are used as 
political control variables to measure the impact of concessional loan on 
government incumbency.  
Moreover, the governance index captures perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of civil service, independence from political 
pressures, and policy formulation and implementation. How well the 
incumbent government performed is measured by the governance index. 
WGI Indices including, political stability and absence of violence, 
regulatory quality and rule of law are used as social control variables. The 
governance indicator is scaled from 0 to 100. The lowest level of 
governance indicator is represented by the zero score, by contrast, one 
hundred score means the highest level of government effectiveness. 
Economic situation is also the result of policies taken by the incumbent 
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government and it is important indicator for government performance. 
Consumer price index is used to capture volatility, and it is expected that 
lower levels of CPI will positively impact the duration of government. In 
addition, FDI is included as control variables to show the effective 
government policy on business environment.  
The data collection is mainly based on the most recent data from National 
Statistical Office of Mongolia and the final year-end reports from Ministry 
of Finance of Mongolia. While the net concessional loan data is only 
available from 1991, I used the data set from above sources from 1991 to 
the end of 2018 for total 27 years. The basic data for this research are, firstly, 
the information of Government of Mongolia and its change throughout the 
times in quarterly basis, and, secondly, the amount of loan borrowed from 
external sources. Data set for control variables are collected from sources 
of World Bank, CEIG and other additional sources.  










Table 3. 1. Descriptions and the Sources of the Variables 
Variable Description Source 
Dependent Variable 
Duration Duration of the government in quarters Gogo portal site 
Independent Variable 
Loan Outstanding amount of concessional 
loan borrowed from donors /MNT 
billion/ 
Ministry of Finance 
of Mongolia 
Control Variable 
Party Party Affiliation www.wikiwand.com 
Coalition Single Party or Coalition Government www.wikiwand.com 
Stability Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence Index from WGI 
World Bank Data 
Quality Regulatory Quality Index from WGI World Bank Data 
Rule of Law Rule of Law Index from WGI World Bank Data 
CPI Consumer Price Index  NSO, Mongolia 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment /USD 
million/ 





3.2. The Estimation Model 
To study the impact of concessional loan on incumbency of the government, 




A dependent variable-Duration of the Government, 
An independent variable-Concessional loan amount 
Control variables- Party affiliation, coalition, political stability and absence 
of violence index, regulatory quality index, rule of law index, consumer 
price index, and foreign direct investment 
α = intercept 
β = regression coefficient 
 
Table 3.2.provides summary statistics of variables for basic simple use for 
the analysis. The data set covers total 112 observations for both, dependent 
and independent variables from 1991 to 2018. For each variable, mean, 





Table 3. 2. Summary Statistics  
























































Maximum duration of the government is 16 quarters that is 4 full years, 
while average duration is 5.4 quarters and the lowest is only1 quarter.  
Average amount of concessional loan outstanding within the year 1991 to 
2018 is 2140,947.59 MNT billion while the lowest amount is only 71.9 
MNT billion nationwide.  










To prove the above hypothesis and to see the relationship between 
dependent and independent variables, preliminary correlation analysis has 









Foreign concessional loan 
Dependent variable 
Government 




Gross Domestic Product 
Government spending 
Consumer Price Index 
Balance of Trade 




Table 3. 3. Result of the preliminary correlation analysis 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 



































The correlation coefficient in between duration of the government and the 
loan outstanding amount is -0.19 which indicates that both variables have 
negative correlation. Also, same correlation result is estimated for the 
coalition, CPI, FDI and regulatory quality. Negative correlation indicates 
that the increasing number of concessional loan amount and other variables 
affect negatively for the duration of government. However the correlation 
result for duration, party affiliation, rule of law and political stability and 
absence of violence index showed that they have moderately positive 
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relationship which indicates that increase of these variables affects higher 
possibility of duration of government. l. Even though the correlations found 
to be negative, it cannot be interpreted that a variable has negative impact 
on another variable. Regression analysis should be carried out in order to 

















CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This chapter provides the main empirical results of the duration of 
government and foreign concessional loan causal relationship. The analysis 
is based on Mongolian economic situation and the government duration.  
4.1. Results 
The results show that foreign concessional loan outstanding amount has a 
positive impact, significant at the 0.1% level when including control 
variables.  
Table 4. 1. Multiple Regression Analysis for Concessional Loan Impact on 
Duration of Government 





Square F Value Pr > F 
Model 8 521.97699 65.24712 7.32 <.0001 
Error 83 740.14257 8.91738   
Corrected Total 91 1262.11957    
 
Root MSE 2.98620 R-Square 0.4136 
Dependent Mean 5.09783 Adj R-Sq 0.3570 









Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept Intercept 1 -2.64355 1.69852 -1.56 0.1234 
Loan Loan 1 6.012794E-7 2.458321E-7 2.45 0.0166 
Party Party 1 2.59109 0.76558 3.38 0.0011 
Coalition Coalition 1 1.38017 1.72061 0.80 0.4248 
CPI CPI 1 0.01273 0.03032 0.42 0.6757 
FDI FDI 1 -0.01416 0.00460 -3.07 0.0029 
Stability Stability 1 4.45786 2.05085 2.17 0.0326 
Quality Quality 1 -9.65392 3.29961 -2.93 0.0044 
RuleofLaw RuleofLaw 1 11.38286 3.99629 2.85 0.0055 
 
According to the analysis, the value of R-squared is 0.4136. In other words, 
41.36% of variance is explained in the regression analysis. The values of F-
test is 0.0001. For this reason, it can be said that the fit of model is reliable.  
In the regression analysis, P value for the causal relationship between 
duration of government and concessional loan is 0.0166 which indicates 
that the variables reject the null hypothesis and the effect is statistically 
significant at 0.05 level. The impact of concessional loan on the government 
incumbency is positive and robust to regression models both with and 
without control variables for the case of Mongolia.   
It is important to note, that the control variables provide useful insight. In 
particular, party affiliation has a positive impact on the duration of the 
government, as well as whether the government is consisted of single party 
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or more than 2 parties. Increase of consumer price index positively impacts 
the duration of the government. Moreover, foreign direct investment, which 
is representing the business environment, has a very low negative impact 
on the duration of government. About the WGI indices, political stability 
and absence of violence index impacts positively on duration of 
government. Same result showed on rule of law index. However, regulatory 
stability shows negative impact to duration of government while used 
together with other variables.   
4.2. Discussion 
The regression analysis results provide interesting insight into the effect 
that foreign concessional loan has on the duration of the government. Due 
to the increasing number of concessional loan that is a main contributor to 
the government debt, I wanted to see how concessional loan effects 
government duration which is to say quite short in Mongolia. In order to 
gain deeper insight into the hypothesis I used control variables to the 
analysis and the result shows a noteworthy story that has strong policy 
implications. 
Regardless of the foreign concessional loan, the outstanding amount creates 
a positive impact on duration of Government of Mongolia. This could mean 
that the concessional loan increase can extend the duration of government. 
In other words, government borrows more concessional loan from donors 
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to stay longer and incumbent.   
As discussed in chapter 2, development partners lend their money mainly 
to the countries which have stable politics and favorable economic situation. 
According to the statement made by Wenli Lu, in many developing 
countries, a change in government ends to change the policy for foreign 
environment. Political risk goes beyond government stability, because even 
a stable government could react to criticisms or threats and create an 
environment and policies unfavorable to international lending operations 
(LuWenli, 2003). If the government takes right policy measures and keeps 
economic situation positively and government stable, then the donors tend 
to lend more concessional loan and government itself can benefit from a 
development lending operation.  
Borrowing concessional loan from development partners may seem like 
very good opportunities followed by many positive effects and impacts. To 
test the effectiveness of ODA, Wenli Lu did analysis on the effectiveness 
of IDA 11  financed projects and the result showed that 50% of project 
outcome is unsatisfactory and substantial impact on development is only 
29% (LuWenli, 2003) which is quite low while the financial source is 
needed to be paid back with the interest.  
                                           
11  IDA, International Development Association, is one of the financial 
organization of World Bank Group. 
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Not only ineffectiveness, Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol found 
that ODA has a negative impact on poor countries because of the large 
dependency governments have on the capital (Djankov, Simeon, Jose G. 
Montalvo, Marta Reynal-Querol, 2008). In this study, the Low-income 
countries displayed lower GDP growth and an average ODA as a ratio of 
GDP of 16%, and it’s likely a much higher percentage of the respective 
government budget as well. This practically means that ODA including 
grant and loan does not give much positive impact on the growth and 
economy of developing and underdeveloped countries.  
While ODA is not efficient enough, government borrows more 
concessional loan for donors. The reason can be to stay in power longer, 
and to implement and finance their action plan with the source of ODA for 
the purpose of their next successful election. It may show positive result in 
a short term, however, in the long run, government debt will increase which 
can lead to possible “Debt Trap Diplomacy”.  
As discussed in chapter 2, Debt trap is becoming a concern for developing 
countries in the modern days. With the support of ODA, namely very few 
countries, such as South Korea, Estonia and Czech Republic, could shift 
from recipient country to donor country since 1960’s when ODA had 
become a major financial source for development. However, the rest of the 
countries, total 133 underdeveloped and developing countries, are still a 
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recipient of ODA and lies in a poverty. Even some countries started losing 
their land to the donors due to the inability of their repayment even though 
the loan term is concessional. For example, through the BRI project, 
defaulters have been pressured by China into surrendering assets and 
territory or allowing military bases on their land. Sri-Lanka built CM port 
with the support of China’s BRI projects. But the country failed to pay their 
loan back. Owing more than USD 1 billion in debts to China, Sri-Lanka 
handed over a port to companies owned by Chinese government on a 99 
year lease. Small country like Tonga also carries out some big debts to 
China and the amount is equal to quarter of a country’s GDP. China is 
taking over Zambia’s international airport after a debt instalment default, 
while Congo is in deep debt due to China-funded projects. Many of these 
projects are linked to the “Belt and Road Initiative”, a bold project to create 
trade routes through huge swathes of Eurasia with China at the center. 
Participating countries are supposed to undertake works on roads and ports 
from China for development, however it turned out to be their loss.       
We cannot expect the same could happen to Mongolia in the future. 
Mongolia has borrowed concessional loan from many donor countries and 
organizations, and the debt level has reached very high and became a 
critical issue to the nation. The graph 4.1 for debt to GDP ratio shows that 
the trend is slightly been increasing in Mongolia. The debt to GDP ratio is 
a bit below the limit set by the Debt Management law of Mongolia which 
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was newly adopted in 2015. Even though the debt limit is set by the law, it 
can be amended year to year depending on the debt level by the authorized 
institution which is the parliament as proposed by the government.   
Graph 4. 1. Government Debt to GDP ratio from 1991-2018 /percentage/ 
Source: Ministry of Finance of Mongolia 
The debt level was lower at 26.7% of GDP in 2011 when the economic 
growth was at peak, but increased when the economy got worsened in 2014-
2016. The graph 4.2 shows the comparison of the fluctuation of GDP 















































































































































Graph 4. 2. Comparison of GDP Growth and Government Debt to GDP ratio from 
1991-2018 
Source: National Statistics Office and Ministry of Finance of Mongolia 
According to the graph, GDP growth and Government Debt to GDP ratio 
have negative relationships. When economy does better and the economic 
environment improves, the debt to GDP ratio goes down. The reason can 
be either the increase of gross domestic product or the decrease in debt 
amount which can be repaid and regulated according to the contract signed 
with the investors. Debt amount decreases not because country pays a 
whole lot amount to the lenders but because country borrows less money 
during the economic development.      
In graph 4.3, the graph of the debt structure of Mongolia is shown 
historically from 1991 to 2018. Since 1991, external sources have been 
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Mongolia has begun to create debts internally which includes internal bonds, 
internal loans from banks, bills and notes, concession/PPP and tax advances. 
But, the external sources still take a huge role with 84% as of 2018 in the 
structure of the debt.   
The government debt has reached 69.5% of GDP as of 2018. This number 
may look no problem to developed countries like Japan or USA, the 
countries with the high amount of debt in the world with 238% and 106% 
of GDP. However, the debt created by those developed countries are 
internally borrowed loans which is nothing to do with debt trap issue. But, 
in the case of Mongolia, 84% of total government debt12  is externally 
borrowed sources, including concessional loan and foreign bonds.  
Graph 4. 3. Government Debt Structure / in MNT
13
 billion/ 
Source: Ministry of Finance of Mongolia 
                                           
12 The detailed data of government debt is shown in appendix D. 



























































































































Concessional loan accounts 59% of total external debt as of 2018. The 
graph 4.4, the structure of the external sources are shown extensively. 
Graph 4. 4. Structure of External Debt /in MNT billion/ 
Source: Ministry of Finance of Mongolia 
Concessional loan in Mongolia had borrowed the most from ADB which is 
a multilateral organization followed by the Government of Japan and China. 
The graph 4.5 shows the concessional loan outstanding of 2018 by creditors. 
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Graph 4. 5. Concessional Loan Outstanding as of 2018 by Donors /in MNT billion/ 
Source: Ministry of Finance of Mongolia 
Multilateral donors are more responsible in terms of its implementation, 
regulations and monitoring. The ones taking attention are the bilateral donor 
countries. One of the creditor, Mongolia had borrowed the highest amount 
of concessional loan, is Japan which is already accounted as our honored 
friend country due to its ODA allocation, amount and years conducted. 
With Japan, Government of Mongolia had implemented total of 27 projects 
with average interest rate of 1.11% for average of 28.9 years since 1990. 
The biggest sector that Japan had invested is road and transport sector with 
33% followed by financial sector with 30% and energy and mining with 
15%. Comparing to Japan, Chinese lending is increasing rapidly last few 
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with 20 year average repayment period14. The condition of loan for China 
is a little harder than Japan with its interest rate and repayment period. The 
sectors Japan and China had invested are shown in graph 4.5. 
Graph 4. 6. Concessional Loan from Japan and China by Sectors from 1990-2018 
  
 
Source: Ministry of Finance of Mongolia 
The loan contract for 48% of Japan funded projects are signed before 2010 
from 1990 to 2009 and the rest is signed from 2010 to 2018. But 80% of 
China’s projects are signed after 2010. The concessional loan project 
                                           
14 The detailed information of number of projects financed by Japan and China are 















































implemented by China are mostly for infrastructure sector. The debt we 
owe only to Japan and China together is 42% of total concessional loan and 
it is 29% of Mongolia’s total GDP.  
We cannot negate Mongolia could face similar debt trap issue like African 
and South Asian countries by losing the part of the country land to other 
country’s ownership or accepting their military bases to our homeland or 
there can be any other consequences we cannot define currently. This is not 
just a debt issue. The sovereignty of a country can be taken into account in 











CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
5.1. Summary of Findings 
The change of government or political instability causes many negative 
impacts to the economy and the society. One of the main issues is the sharp 
increase of government debt which may lead to “debt trap diplomacy”, 
some of the developing countries are facing nowadays. So that, this thesis 
sought to analyze the causal relationship between government incumbency 
and concessional loan for the case Mongolia to find whether the ODA 
affects the political instability.  
Previous studies have investigated deeply into the conception of 
government incumbency and how political power affects the incumbency 
of the government, how incumbent government can affect to the society and 
the economy, what relationship the government and ODA have, and what 
impact ODA have on the recipient country. This study puts more stress on 
the role of concessional loan because loan is the main contributor to the 
government debt. In this respect, this study made attempts to test the 
hypothesis that concessional loan has a positive impact on the duration of 
the incumbent government, and if government borrows more concessional 




The analysis draws upon a data set of 27 years of government incumbency, 
and concessional loan outstanding amount of Mongolia over the period 
from 1991 to 2018. The control variables used in the regression models are 
party affiliation, coalition government, political stability and absence of 
violence index, regulatory quality index, rule of law index, consumer price 
index, and foreign direct investment amount. 
The findings of the study showed that the causal relationship between two 
variables have positive result which indicates that concessional loan 
increase makes the duration of government longer and have contribution on  
the politics for staying more stable. In other words, we can conclude that 
government borrows more concessional loan from donors to stay longer in 
power and use the external financial sources to finance projects and 
activities in line with their political interests.   
There are endless debates on the efficiency and the impact of ODA still 
going on within experts. Additionally, the study shows the facts that some 
projects implemented by making huge debts owed to foreign countries are 
inefficient after implementation, and the ODA is not necessarily an 
effective tool for economic growth and development of the country. The 
reason for inefficiency is that donor countries have their own economic 
interest and target the developing and poor countries with potential income 
or any other resources. Another reason for inefficiency is that the allocated 
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financing is not used efficiently where it is needed and recipient countries 
face to buy products at higher prices which makes the ODA result 
inefficient at the end.  
Not only inefficiency, study also emphasizes negative impacts of ODA, 
including the increase of poverty and inequality, and corruption, to the 
recipient country. The worst is a debt trap which has become an important 
issue recently, because many developing countries fall into debt trap due to 
its inability to repay their debt back to the donor country. Due to the poor 
public policy, government borrows huge amount of concessional loan from 
foreign countries for short-sighted projects, and this makes the level of 
government debt increase sharply. In the long run, countries may have to 
face reconsideration of their sovereignty issue as a result of their poor ODA 
policy.  
5.2. Policy Implications and Limitations 
While the projects financed by ODA source show no effective results to the 
economy and society after implementation according to some studies stated 
in the literature review, the causal relationship between concessional loan 
and government incumbency showed positive result indicating that increase 
of concessional loan can extend the government duration which is a part of 
political stability. In that case, developing country like Mongolia may need 
to focus on two major policies; well regulated stable institutions and 
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systems, and well- formulated ODA policy. 
As discussed earlier, the change of government ends to change the policy 
environment. The Government of Mongolia changed once in average of 1.9 
years which tend to change the whole systems and policies more frequently. 
To aim for further growth both in economy and society, we need well- 
regulated stable government institutions and systems. The public 
institutions should be independent from political institutions in terms of its 
operationalization and formulation of policies which should be reached to 
every citizen in the country. Furthermore, to separate political activities 
from public institutions, government should take actions towards omitting 
political influence and political party membership from each individual 
public servants, and develop and promote attitudes towards public ethic 
within them. 
For increasing the economic and social growth of the country and 
preventing from possible debt crisis, the country should have well-
formulated ODA policy, especially during this time, the ODA is in demand. 
Mongolia is currently implementing 76 projects financed by concessional 
loan which has to be paid with its interest back to the donors. As shown in 
appendix I, 52% of outstanding amount of ongoing concessional loan 
projects are implemented in road and transport sector, 16% is in financial 
sector, and the rest of the sectors account for quite small amount. Most of 
57 
 
concessional loan focused on road and transport sectors that do not have 
direct impact on economic and social growth of the country and do not 
generate income, but account lots of government debt. The ODA policy and 
long term development policy should be linked, and government should 
focus on long term development of the country rather than focusing on short 
sight of political interests.  
Although this study has policy implications based on analyzing the causal 
relationship between concessional loan and government incumbency, there 
is a limitation regarding data sets used for testing. Most data for economic, 
social and political indicators are available from 2000’s to 2018 in yearly 
basis in Mongolia. Due to the lack of data availability, only 91 out of 112 
selected data is estimated due to missing variables in the regression analysis.  
For further studies, the extended research including and comparing other 
developing countries to test the causal relationship of the government 
incumbency and concessional loan in the broader sense may take account 
of multiple facets of the government. Furthermore, including different 
economic and political indicators for the analysis as control variables and 
test using different models may give more valuable explanation for the 
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GDP GROWTH OF MONGOLIA FROM 1991-2018 
/PERCENTAGE/ 













































TITAL EXPORT BY COUNTRY AND PRODUCT TYPE FROM 
2005-2018 
Total Export by Countries from 2005-2018 /percentage/ 
Source: National Statistics Office of Mongolia 
Total Export by Product Type from 2005-2018 /percentage/ 






























GOVERNMENT INCUMBENCY PERIOD SINCE 1990 
 
Gov’t #     Started  Terminated   Incumbency   Incumbency 
     in Days     in Years    
1    12/12/1984 3/21/1990   1925      5.3 
2    3/21/1990 9/11/1990    174       0.5 
3    9/11/1990 7/21/1992    679      1.9 
4    7/21/1992 7/19/1996   1459      4.1 
5    7/19/1996 4/23/1998    643      1.8 
6    4/23/1998 12/9/1998    230      0.6 
7    12/9/1998 7/22/1999    225      0.6 
8    7/22/1999 7/30/1999     8      0.0 
9    7/30/1999 7/26/2000    362      1.0 
10    7/26/2000 8/20/2004   1486      4.1 
11    8/20/2004 1/13/2006    511      1.4 
12    1/25/2006 11/22/2007    666      1.9 
13    11/22/2007 10/28/2009    706      2.0 
14    10/29/2009 8/9/2012      1015      2.8 
15    8/9/2012 10/5/2014    787       2.2  
16    11/21/2014 7/30/2016    617      1.7 
17    7/30/2016 9/8/2017        405      1.1 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NUMBER OF PROJECTS FINANCED BY GOVERNMENT OF 





Energy and mining 1 
Health 1 
Industry and construction 1 
Information technology 1 
Road and Transport 12 
Japan 27 
Education 2 
Energy and mining 4 
Finance 8 
Manufacturing and trade 2 
Road and Transport 9 
Social Welfare 2 
Grand Total 47 
 













































CONCESSIONAL LOAN OUTSDANDING AMOUNT BY DONOR 







Kuwait Fund 570.87 
IFAD 339.16 
Credit Suesse 284.24 
Japan 140.85 
India 81.91 
Abu-Dabi Fund 74.36 
Spain 67.95 
Nordic Development Fund 65.55 
France 43.72 
South Korea 21.15 
Austria 14.11 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX I  
THE PERCENTAGE OF CONCESSIONAL LOAN 











THE PERCENTAGE OF CONCESSIONAL LOAN 




















Road and Transport 32% 
Energy and Mining 8% 
Social Welfare 4% 
Health 4% 
Agriculture 3% 
Water Supply, City Infrastructure and Service  3% 
Education 3% 
Information and Technology 3% 
Industry and Construction 2% 
Trade  1% 
Justice and Regulation 1% 
Sector Percentage 
Road and Transport 52% 
Finance 16% 
Health 7% 
Industry and Construction 5% 
Agriculture 5% 
Education 5% 
Energy and Mining 4% 
Water Supply, City Infrastructure and Service  3% 
Information an Technology 2% 
Social Welfare 1% 
Justice andd Regulation 0% 




양허성 차관이 정부의 
재임기간에 미치는 영향:  








   본 논문은 몽골의 외국의 양허성 차관과 정부 재임기간과의 
인과관계를 규명하고자 한다. 그 결과, 다중 회귀분석을 이용해 
두 변수 사이의 인과관계를 보면 양허성 차관이 늘어나면 현 
정부가 더 오래 머무를 수 있다는 긍정적인 결과가 나타났다. 
결론은 정부가 장기 집권을 위해 공여국으로부터 더 많은 
양허성 차관을 얻고 그들의 정치적 이익에 부합하는 프로젝트에 
자금을 대기 위해 외국 차관을 사용한다는 것이다. 
게다가, 문헌 조사에서는 외국의 양허성 차관으로 자금을 
조달하는 일부 프로젝트는 비효율적이고 공적개발원조(ODA)는 
경제성장과 국가의 발전에 효과적인 수단이 아니라는 사실을 
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설명한다. 비효율적인 이유는 공여국들이 그들 자신의 경제적 
이익을 가지고 있고 그들의 필요에 따라 그 이익을 목표로 삼기 
때문이다. 또한, 할당된 재원은 필요한 곳에서 효율적으로 
사용되지 않고, 수원국들은 더 높은 가격으로 제품을 구입하기 
때문에, 결국 공적개발원조 프로젝트 결과는 비효율적이다. 
비효율적인 것뿐만 아니라, 본 논문에서 공적개발원조의 
부정적 영향에 대해서도 논의하였다. 가장 나쁜 것은 최근 
몽골을 포함한 개발도상국들에게 중요한 이슈가 되고 있는 것은 
채무 함정인데, 많은 개발도상국들이 공여국에게 채무를 갚지 
못해 채무의 함정에 걸려 있기 때문이다. 정부가 만든 부실 
공적개발원조의 정책 때문에 국가들의 대외채무가 급증하고 
주권국가들은 독립성을 재고해야 할 처지에 놓여있다. 
주제어: 공적개발원조(ODA), 양허성 차관, 정부 재임기간, 
국가채무 
Student ID: 2018-26256    
 
